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Internal Power Structure Shifting in Syria: The New Regional Alignment in Post Assad Era

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تحول تركيبة القوة الداخلي في سوريا : التموضع الإقليمي الجديد في ما بعد حقبة الأسد

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الملخص

يهدف هذا البحث إلى تحليل التحول المفاجئ في تركيبة القوة الداخلية في سوريا، وكيف أدى ذلك إلى تداعيات جيوستراتيجية على مستوى النظام الإقليمي والنظام الدولي. إنه محاولة للإجابة على تساؤلات مفادها: ماذا يحدث عندما تتغير بنية و تركيبة القوة الداخلية فجأة، وما هي التأثيرات المترتبة على النظام الإقليمي؟يوضح البحث أنه في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠٢٤، أدى الانهيار المفاجئ للسلطة السياسية الداخلية في سوريا والتحول الهيكلي إلى عواقب محلية وإقليمية ودولية متعددة. ومن بين هذه العواقب، تحول هوية الدولة وأيديولوجيتها، حيث أدرك مسؤولو الدولة الجدد التهديدات والفرص وفقاً للهوية الجديدة، مما أدى في النهاية إلى تغيير ميزان القوى الإقليمي والمشهد الجيوسياسي في الشرق الأوسط.يُعدّ التغير الهيكلي الداخلي الذي حدث في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠٢٤ نقطة الإسناد المرجعية لهذه الورقة البحثية، وهي تقر بالظروف الهيكلية الإقليمية والداخلية السائدة قبل ذلك التاريخ.

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the sudden transformation of the internal power structure in Syria, and its lead to geopolitical ramifications at the level of regional order level of international order. It's an attempt to answer the questions what happens when suddenly the internal power structure transforms, what will be the impacts on the regional order? The research presents that in December 2024, the sudden collapse of the internal political power in Syria and structural transformation, have had several domestic, regional, and international consequences. Among these consequences is the transformation of the state's identity and ideology, the new state officials perceived threats and opportunities in accordance with the new identity, eventually has altered the regional balance of power and the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East.The reference point of the paper, is the internal structural change happened in December 2024. It recognizes the regional and the internal structural conditions; before that date.**Key words: Internal power shift, State identity, new foreign policy, regional order and Middle East.**

Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Design

1.1Introduction

In 2011, the Arab Spring sparked in Syria as a wave of protest aimed to transform the entire political structure of power in the country. The protesters turned out to be rebels, and then the country descended to civil war; mainly between Alawite Shia Islamic oriented and Sunni Islamic oriented, fragmented the social structure of the society and decomposed political structure. In December 2024, a coalition of Sunni fighters extremists known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham led an offensive campaign against the Syrian government forcing Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to leave the country and ending 50 years of secular Baath Party, and Alawite minority ruling of the country. The Alawite minority has been supported by Shia Islamic Republic of Iran, lined with "Axis of Resistance" while the Syrian rebels, mainly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Syrian National Army (SNA) and other factions have been supported by Turkey and other Gulf countries. The sudden fall of al-Assad's regime, changed

the internal power structure and reconstructed the state apparatus with a new Islamic Sunni oriented identity and ideology. Consequently, the new political elite made new alliance and new alignment in the region, which altered the regional order. In other words, the victory of majority Sunni against minority of Alawite marks the change of the state apparatus, power structure in Syria which in turn changed identity and ideology of state and perception of the state elite how to response to threats configure and address foreign policy and to the regional system, eventually altered the regional order of power and create a new geopolitical dynamic in the region. The research is an academic attempt to address the interaction among three variables the sudden transformation of internal power structure, state identity and ideology the new realignment in the regional order that created new geopolitical dynamic.

1.2 Research Methodology

The article investigates how domestic power structure transformation alter the regional power distribution and the balance of power. For the purpose of the study the analytical deductive qualitative method on the single case study in Syria is applied. The secondary data that has been used for the study, including, books articles, policy paper, new Constitution of Syria and decrees of interim president. Syria is a unique case that secular Baath Party, minority Alawite ruled over majority, suddenly total structural transformation happened in December 2024, majority Sunni oriented took power restructures state apparatus, identity and ideology of the state.

1.3 Research Objectives

The research is an academic attempt to analyze interaction among the key three variables, the sudden transformation of internal power structure, state identity and ideology, and the new realignment in the region that generate a geopolitical shift in Middle East**.**

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Literature Review

In 1922, for the first time Alawite gained political autonomy under French colonial, along with Aleppo, Damascus and Jabal Druze (Pipes,1989). French empowered minorities especially Alawite (Fildiş, 2012). The premature of the ending of French Mandate in 1946, left Syria to face several military coups, afflicted country with political instability. The last Sunni head of the state Noureddin Mustafa Ali al-Atas was overthrown by Hafiz al-Assad in November 1970 (Pipes,1989). After two decades of the political instability, Hafez al-Assad and Alawite could stabilize Syria and save it from relentless military coup. Al-Assad started to consolidate and institutionalize Alawite power over military institutions, security agencies and Baath Party. (Van Dam, 2011)"Alawi power resulted from unplanned but sectarian transformation of public life in Syria" (Pipes,1989, p,430). Alawite controlled economic political and security agencies the society divided into ruling class mainly Alawite and to ruled group Sunni. Hafiz al-Assad; shifted internal power structure to be controlled by the minority. Al-Assad; centralized power at hand the of President and built a new state structure, in which political power distributed unequally among society, marginalizing Sunni component and denial existence of Kurds. Alawite officers, and personnel stormed into state institutions especially security and military, "despite being a minority, the percentage of Alawi officers has grown from 61% in 1997 to 80% in 2012(Drevon, 2024, p. 33). Thus, Alawite controlled the state apparatus, in a sense despite, Baath Party, adopted secular and pan-Arabism ideology, Alawite, perception, identity and ideology became unofficial identity and ideology of Syria. This model of internal power structure continued consolidated over five decades. (Van Dam, 2011) *Like other Arab countries in the region, the modern nation state has not shaped in the Westphalian form in Syria, "The incongruity of identity and territory continues to destabilize the Middle East to qualify the Westphalia model" (Hinnebusch, 2001, p. 72).* The internal power structure of the state and political community is afflicted with crises of identity and legitimacy (Hinnebusch, 2001). In a way that minority was ruling majority in Syria and Iraq too *Sunni component and Kurds questioned the legitimacy of the internal power structure.* One of the political motivations of Sunni rebels was to re-legitimize the structure of public power that governs society, as Khouri states "Arab man and woman collectively demanded not their right of citizens but to re-legitimize power structure" (Khouri, 2011). Since Sunni are majority the process of the "relegitimization" by default led to the transformation of the internal power structure. In December 2024, Sunni rebels took over Damascus, one month later Ahmed al-Sharaa has been appointed as interim president of new Syria. Al-Sharaa made a historical decision and decree about the internal power structure in the country, he dissolved the state apparatus, disbanded the Syria army, all security agencies, disbanded the Bath Party and deconstructed the state institutions. The decisions shifted power structure of the country in two ways, first transformed secular state to an Islamic Sunni, marginalized Shiite minority Alawite. Second, ended the secular Baath Party era. Regionally, over last 40 years

Syria was a key ally to Iran, thousands of Shia fighters from Iraq known as Popular Mobilization Force, Shia fighters of Afghanistan Fatmiyun, Pakistan Zaynabyun were deployed in Syria. Syria was the only corridor of Iran's expansion to Mediterranean Sea, the end of Bashar al-Assad; and Alawite era in Syria, means, Iranian logistic support for Hezbollah in Lebanon blocked. It means the rise of Sunni component in Syria by default changed regional order. (Australian Institute of International Affairs,2024 The shifting of internal power dynamic "has led to power shift in the region" (Adar et al, 2025) created a space for Sunni states including Turkey, Qatar Saudi Arabia and UAE to enhance the relations with new interim government in Damascus. For instance, Turkey backed different Sunni fighter groups including HTS and SNA the leaders of these group assumed high senior position in the interim government. (Adar et al, 2025) In May 2025, President of Interim Authority Ahmad Al-Sharaa, engaged in diplomatic meetings with Saudi Arabia. In Riyadh he met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, where he met President Donald Trump too. The meeting was the first step for realignment with Sunni regional countries. (Ruck, 2025). Saudi promised billions of dollars for reconstruction the Syria, mediating diplomatic engagement with the U.S and EU. For the Saudi lining up with a Sunni Arabic states on the one hand, aims to block Shia expansion in Iran and/or Iraq, pushes Syria to enter new regional order of Sunnis and create a balance of power against Israeli expansion on the other hand.Scholars investigated foreign policy of Syria mainly in three approaches, Structural realism, Neoclassical Realism and Constructivism. Francesco Belcastro, address a question what are main factors drove authoritarian state to build up or break alliance in the regional state system? He argues that neither Structural realism nor Constructivism could explain the complexities of the geopolitical system of Middle East that shaped foreign policy of Syria between 1963-1989. He presents Neoclassical Realism to explain foreign policy of the country. In this case "Neoclassical Realism will allow a focus on the interaction of international and domestic factors and its effect on the alliances of Syria" (Belcastro, 2019, p.14). For Syria despite Pan Arabism ideology of Baath Party, the regional state system and "unfavored balance of power" determined foreign policy of Syria to shape a new alliance and breaking other (Belcastro,2019) in other words, the normative ideology does not explain the state behavior in the region. It created a complex interaction between state ideology and elite perception of threats on the one hand, and international distribution of power on the other.To Hinnebusch these complexities explain the contradiction of the Syria foreign policy, for instance, in 1980s, though Baath Party in Syria advocating on Pan-Arabism ideology and Arab unification, Damascus did not make alliance with Baath Party in Iraq, which was holding the same ideology, instead Syria chose to make alliance with Iran against Iraq. "In 1963 the Baath party took over power in Damascus and Baghdad. The ideological alignment between the two countries frequently proved to be a factor of division rather than cooperation and solidarity." *(Hinnebusch, 2001, p. 236* Barnett applies Constructivist theory to explain foreign policy of Arab countries. He argues that foreign policy decisions of Arab country including Syria cannot explained by balance of power or international pressure, however, social structure, norms, culture, ideology and identity play key role in the decisions of the foreign policy. Barnett calls the regional political events in Arab world as "Dialogue" such as Baghdad Pact 1956, normalization of relation between Egypt and Israel Camp David Accord in 1979. He argues that any international or regional issues such as confrontation with Israel is not merely international or regional that determines by balance of power or making alliance, rather its part of Arab identity and socially driven by "ideology and identity of state". in other words, Barnett rejects the idea of structural Realism to explain the "Dialogue" in Arab politics (Barnett,1998).He argues that "Arab leaders were in a social situation defined by mutual dependence: because of their shared Arab identity, they determined the norms of Arabism collectively, were expected to honor those norms, and generally did so because of their desire for the social approval that came with being associated with Arabism" (Barnett, 1998, p. 29). Barnett challenging structural Realism, argues that "Arab leaders occupied two roles: agent of a sovereign state and agent of the wider Arab political community." On the hand the leaders should protect and secure the sovereign state that has been drawn by the west. On the other leader should speak on behalf of *Umma al Arabiya*. The latter is symbolic based on shared identity and culture of Arabism it is socially constructed (Barnett, 1998, p.33).According to Constructivism the ideology of Pan Islamism drives Arab states to make alliances together, as we have seen in 1973 in "Triangle Alliances" (Barnett, 1998). However, one can argue that the Pan Arab ideology, failed in the very first practical test of the regional order, when unification of with Egypt and Iraq doomed to be abortive. The Camp David in 1979 announcement of normalization between Egypt and Israel was manifesto of the end of Pan Arab ideology According, to Hinnebusch, the Syrian foreign policy mainly determined by two factors, first, Arab identity seeks beyond recognized territorial boundary of Syria. Secondly international pressure and balance of power in the regional and international level, Hinnebusch stated "Syria's

foreign policy was rooted in both its Arab national identity and the frustration of the ambitions inherent in that identity" (Hinnebusch 2014, p. 231)Normative structure of Pan Arabism faded away in the practical daily foreign policy, that pushes Syria to be rational and pragmatic (Hinnebusch 2014). Another manifesto of the failure in 1980s when Assad lined up with Iran against Baath twin sister in Iraq. Hinnebusch argues that overtime Syrian foreign policy shrinkage its identity from Pan Arabism to Syrian identity, Transition toward Syrian identity was response "to external threats and opportunities varies according to internal factors, notably elite threats perception and the capacity of institutions to mobilize power." (Hinnebusch 2014, p, 20) the limitation left Syria a small space to maneuver in foreign policy and mobilize regional resources.Few scholars and literature have addressed, what happens when the internal power structure in Syria is transformed from secular Baath, Alawite minority to Islamic Sunni majority. How the foreign policy of Syria will change? How Syria perceives new threats and opportunities in the regional system.

2.2 Theoretical Approach

To comprehend the dynamic transformation in Syria internal political structure and its geopolitical ramification that changed the regional balance of power through one single theory several outstanding questions will remain without addressing. Therefore, multi-framework approaches and /or integrated theoretical approaches can be applied on the Syrian case. For this purpose; Neoclassical realism, and Constructivism theory are applied According to Neoclassical Realism that the foreign policy of states operates according two ontological point of view. First, the key independent variable international pressure including, emerging alliances, threats, determine the second variable states to response accordingly states are depending variable, which perceives the pressure differently. State elite, decision makers and institutions by default evaluate the international threats and opportunity to adapt new foreign policy (Kitchen, 2010). In other words, "Emerging new threats in the international system necessitates on the senior political elite and state institutions to conceptualize the threats and set new strategies to address it". (Hinnebusch 2014, p 33-36). The interaction between regional and international state system such as distribution of power, alliance and threats, and the state institutions, new bureaucracy and senior leaderships forges a state behavior align with ontological perceptions of the state. (Kitchen, 2010)In this case the third intervention variable plays key role of the state behavior and response to the international pressure, the third variable includes domestic pressure on the state, such as political legitimacy, state identity and ideology, military and economic capability. The neoclassical realism treats state apparatus as coherent single centric that act as a "transmission belt" to adapt with the international pressure (Hinnebusch 2001). The limitation of the argument is; what happens to international system if the "transmission belt" suddenly collapses. In this case Neoclassical Realism doesn't address questions, if the position of the variable's changes. Constructive theory is another approach address the internal power structure of state and regional state system of Middle east "regional order, the norms that should regulate their relations, and how those norms express their Arab identities" (Barnett,1998, p.3). *The significance of the social constructivist theory is to bring inter-subjective factors such as identity, ideology, culture, sectarianism into the international system (Aguis, 2010). The international structure of power is not determining state behavior as Neorealists claim, but it is constructed by actors and agents (Aguis, 2010). The International Constructivism theory has three ontological perspectives. The first ontological position in international relations "is normative ideational structures are important as much as; if not more than material structures" (Aguis, 2010:50). For instance, ideology was a key importance during the Cold War, and it is still a determinant factor in Iranian foreign policy. In this sense, it stands opposite to Structural Realism Neoclassical Realism. The second ontological position identities determined interests for actors and agents in the international system (Aguis, 2010:50). Finally, agents and structures mutually construct each other (Aguis, 2010:51).* Barnett argues, "It is state identity that plays an eminent role in identifying and constructing threats and thus in choosing alliance partners" (Muller, 2011:7). Therefore, states make a balance of threats rather than a balance of power because threats should be perceived according identity, ideology, and culture. The basis of the balance is normative values rather than interests (Muller, 2011:7)Hinnebusch suggests complex realism to comprehend foreign policy in Middle East, he argues the realist approach to middle east is problematic that because states artificial not necessary a cohesive unit, dependency in foreign policy, multilayer system of operation in middle east and finally the state identity issue (Hinnebusch, 2014).The existing literature Neoclassical Realism, Constructivism and Complex Realism address Syrian state as a stable "transmission belt" that response to the international pressure and regional order, however, they did not take into consideration what will happen, when the internal state apparatus collapses, in case of Syria, what will happen when a secular

religious minority Alawite is overthrown by religious majority component Sunni, what will be the geopolitical ramification especially when a country is bordering with Sunni and Shia state.

Chapter 3: Results and Discussion

3.1 Internal power dynamic shift

The triumph of Sunni Syrian opposition groups marked dismantling of the Baath regime, Alawite political power structure, consolidating a new Sunni power structure. Since December 2024 and the internal power structure transformed. On January 29, 2025, in Victory Conference of the coalition of opposition groups including all Syria Sunni armed groups except of Syrian Democratic Forces, decided to install Ahmad Al-Sharaa as interim President of Syria. Al-Sharaa was a leader Jabhat al-Nusra Al-Qaeda branch in Syria and then later a leader of Hayat Tahrir Sham (HTS) the most radical Sunni armed faction between 2012-2024. Al-Sharaa appointed his former Sunni lords of war in key security, economic and foreign policy positions In the Conference, the Military Operation Administration announced key decisions to overthrow the political power structure, including annulment of the Constitution, dissolving of People Assembly, disbanding of Syria army and forming a new army consisting of Sunni armed factions. The announcement has been considered the first step of internal power shift, and fundamental structural transformation of the country, consequently changing the state apparatus, institutions, identity and ideology. The transformation indicating of disbanding the old secular Baath Party, Alawite minority under "transmission belt", institutionalization of the Islamic Sunni power "transmission belt". In other words, the variable of internal power structure shifted and determined intermediate variable "transmission belt". Ontologically speaking the shift changes perception of the new political elite in Damascus to the regional and world politics.

3.2 Perception, identity and ideology

Alawite sectarian component controlled key security and military offices in the country and controlled political and economic sphere. They were playing on the sectarian sentiment by Baath leaders started 1960s (Hinnebusch, 2001). A Sunni leader Amin al-Hafiz supported Sunnis, while; Salah Jadid supported Alawite to control state apparatus, the showdown ended with victory of the minority. Since Baath Party regime took power, Syria became central to the secular Arab nationalism and Alawite minority; controlling security, military institutions and articulating national security and foreign policy (Hinnebusch, 2001) The Syria civil war from 2012 to 2024, capitalizing the sectarian "national division" of the country (Hinnebusch, 2001). December 2024, marked transformation of the ideology and identity of the new Syria. On 13 March, the new temporary Constitution mandated the fundamental change of the state identity and ideology, article 3 stipulated that "The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam; Islamic jurisprudence shall be a major source of legislation" (Syria Arab Republic, 2025, Art 3) This article established a Sunni Islamic orientation as the core of the state's identity and ideology. Although a permanent constitution has not ratified yet, the empowering and institutionalization of Islamic Sunni identity and ideology has become the *de facto* reality of the post al-Assad; era (International Christian Concern, 2025)The internal power dynamic shift transformed state from secular Baath Alawite minority, to Islamic Sunni oriented. Consequently, changed the of normative structure of the state identity and ideology and alter the way new political elite in Damascus perceive enemy and friends and making alliance and set new foreign policy strategy accordingly. The changes accentuate the argument that internal dynamic shift changes the state identity and ideology to perceive regional power distribution accordingly.

3.4 Regional realignment

After December 2024, the transformation of the inner power structure led to transformation of the "transmission belt". The senior political elites, decision makers of foreign policy reassess the threats and opportunities at the regional and international level. Once Asaa'd al-Shaibani assumed office of Foreign Ministry of interim government, the perception process to the regional politics transformed dramatically. The political realignment orchestrated based on the new identity of state. Syria started to approach to the Gulf countries and Turkey.For more than four decades Iran engaged with Syria in strategic relations, including security military, intelligence and economic treaties. In 2011 when civil war sparked in Syria, Iran deployed thousands of Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the its proxies in the region to support the regime.On December 2024, Iran lost a key strategic ally in the region. "The collapse of the al-Assad; regime sharply weakened Iran's forward-defense doctrine and stripped away much of the strategic and ideological depth it had built through Syria over the past decade" (Toprak, 2025, p.2).During Baath regime the relations between Damascus and Tehran institutionalized in several economic, military, security, and diplomatic cultural treaties and agreement, including Military Cooperation Agreement 2018, Military Cooperation and Reinforce Air Defense System Agreement. Iran military bases

extended from Damascus to Aleppo. “It had 570 military and intelligence sites, 515 outposts and 55 military bases, and 42 military divisions of pro Iran groups, 70,000 Basij volunteer.” (Mahdi 2025)Politically and culturally, Iran engaged in the international negations about Syria including Geneva 1 in 2014 and Astana 2018, handing over chemical weapons to Organization Prohibition of Chemical Weapon in 2013. In term soft power over 500 Hussainiya, and six universities opened in Syria. In 2015 Iran could convince Russia to intervene militarily and save the regime. (Mahdi 2025).After fall of al-Assad; President of Ahmad Al-Sharaa issued several Executive Decrees annulled the treaties and agreements with Iran, considered presence of Iranian military security personal as illegal, Al-Sharaa stated in Chatham House “we don’t have problem with Iran, in Tehran, but the problem with Iran in Damascus” (Chatham House 2025). Th new Syria perceives Iran as a threat rather than an alliance, it pushes back Iranian influence in the region. Consequently, redistributing power and a shifting regional order, The new ruling elite in Damascus perceived Sunni-majority states specifically Turkey and Gulf countries especially Saudi Arabia as vital partners to balance regional threats and secure economic stabilization “Syria’s reintegration into the regional economy and coordinated engagement by Türkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia that prospect is rapidly slipping out of reach.” (Toprak, 2025, p 2)The points with the dramatic shift of internal power dynamic, state identity and ideology transformed from secular Baath Party controlled by Alawite minority to Sunni Islamic oriented. The new political elite in Damascus set new foreign policy to end the leverage of Shia expansion and realignment with Sunni states.Though gulf countries and Turkey are not cohesive Islamic Sunni oriented state. Each of them has its strategic calculation to make alliance with Syria, for instance Turkey’s motivation is to prevent any Kurdish aspiration for independence in northeast Syria, and to balance against Israel, while for Saudi the calculation is more about the blocking Iranian expansion and create a balance of power against Iran Shia majority. The purpose of the research is to explore Syrian driven foreign policy. For Damascus, without the total collapse of the state apparatus and shifting internal power dynamic from Alawite minority to Sunni majority. The new perception of foreign policy would not have shaped that ultimately led to new regional order that share Sunni Islamic identity, and block Shia Islamic expansion in the region. In this case, the internal dynamic shift resulted from total collapse of state, the led to transformation of state identity an ideology, accordingly created new balance of power and new regional order.

3.5 Syria and Israel

Syria is located between two non-Arab countries, Isreal from south, and Turkey from north (Hinnebusch 2001, p. 135-136) and also from east is surrounded by Iraqi Shia a key alliance of Iran, and Hezbollah of Lebanon another threat from south. In other words, the new Syria is surrounded by “Axis of Resistance” Israel, it has made Syria to be in a vulnerable geopolitical position. Despite, Disengagement Agreement in 1974, after the fall of al-Assad; Israel controlled “demilitarize buffer zone”, and deployed troops in Hermon Mountain (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2025, p. 3). Historically “Israel has permanent military superiority” over Syria (Hinnebusch 2001, p. 137). The Israeli expansion in the north toward Syria, supporting minorities particularly Druze created new geopolitical reality.To reduce the international pressure, the political elite Damascus engaged in Diplomatic effort to make alliance Turkey and other Arab Islamic Sunni oriented countries in the Persian Gulf. The new Syria practically has tacit alliance with Turkey. Additionally, “Al-Sharaa has repeatedly communicated his desire to avoid conflict with Israel, with figures close to him even signaling an interest in normalization**”** (Israel Policy Forum, 2025, p. 4) and also demanded from Isreal to not violate the Disengagement Agreement (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2025).

Chapter 4: Conclusion

The sudden transformation of the internal power structure in Syria from secular Baath, Alawite minority to Islamic Sunni majority, and institutionalization of the new Sunni sectarian norms, has changed the state discourses, identity and ideology. The new Islamic Sunni elite in Damascus perceive, reassess threats and opportunities in the regional and international level, it changed the state behavior in the region, and Syria addressed and approached new foreign policy.The new Syria pushes back Iranian influence including “Axis of Resistance” and Shia majority in Iraq in the region, while to deter new threats from Israel and Shia countries in the region, the Foreign Minister Asaa’d Al-Shaibani engaged in diplomatic shuttle with Sunni Islamic countries to make new alliance. The post Bashar al-Assad; strategy of foreign policy created new regional order and shifted the geopolitical landscape in Middle East. The new regional order would have been impossible without the transformation of internal power structure.Theoretically, the mainstream of international relation theories including Structural Realism Neoclassical Realism and Constructivism are overemphasizing on the independent variable of international pressure, and ideational factors subsequently, while in case of the suddenly

transformation of the internal political power structure is driving the foreign policy. It other words, the moment of the sudden collapse of the and transformation inner power politics may the variables reverses or equally determine each other. In this case the internal power structure shapes the foreign policy and regional order rather than reflecting it. This case may repeat in other countries that have problematic internal power structure, particularly in the Middle East countries when ethnic or religious minority ruling the country Intonational actors and policy makers should not exclusively study and monitor the, distribution of power, regional order and international pressure. They should engage in deep study and analysis of domestic affairs of states, to proactively assess the sudden transformation, and how the transformation of the internal power dynamic may shape the regional order and shift geopolitical landscape.

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